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his research has focused on how policy relates to educational provision particularly for 
marginalised young people. His work has a conceptual focus on assemblage and the 
politics of subjectivity.  
The new youth sector assemblage: reforming youth provision through 
a finance capital imaginary 
The language of austerity has been widely used to characterize policy-making in 
post-industrial nations since the financial crisis. Youth services in England are a 
noted example of the effects of austerity, having suffered rapid and severe cuts 
following a period of record investment prior to 2008. In this article, I argue that 
‘austerity’ is an inadequate conceptual basis for critical analysis of policy-making 
since 2008, and that youth services are better understood as an exemplar case of 
the reforming effects of a ‘late neoliberal regime’. The late neoliberal regime 
describes a regulation of production through a finance capital imaginary, as 
distinct from the productive capital imaginary of the quasi-marketising neoliberal 
regime. I argue that late neoliberalism has effected the disassembly of quasi-
marketised youth services and simultaneously the emergence of a new youth 
sector founded on norms of investment and return. I trace the reforming force of 
this regime through the productive relations of capital distributions, policy 
discourse, and organizational forms.  
Keywords: neoliberalism; youth services; assemblage; social investment; 
austerity  
Introduction 
The financial crisis of 2008 sent shock waves through social, political and economic 
domains, shaping massively complex globalised processes of public service assemblage 
(Deleuze and Guatari 2004b, a). In developed economies with high levels of debt, one 
effect has been the widespread adoption of central government strategies of fiscal 
constraint or ‘austerity’ with respect to public services (Clarke and Newman 2012). The 
UK is a prominent example, and, in the field of education, youth services in England 
have been particularly affected. In the five years since fiscal year 2007/8, the United 
Kingdom went from record investment in youth services to effectively ending the 
national project of open-access youth provision begun in 1938. Central government 
spending on youth services fell rapidly and ministerial responsibility was moved out of 
the Department for Education and rolled into a wider ministerial brief for charities and 
social investment (Cabinet Office 2015). As the UK’s National Youth Agency stated, 
‘there is no longer a common form of youth service across England’ (DfE 2014b, 2).  
However, austerity is inadequate as a critical account of policy change regarding 
youth services since the financial crash. Rather, youth services can be better understood 
as an exemplar case of the reforming force of a ‘late neoliberal’ regime of power that 
emerged after the financial crisis, with transnational significance for social policy 
(McGimpsey 2017). This article explores how the regulatory force of this regime has 
rapidly ‘disassembled’ quasi-marketised youth services in Englandi (Youdell and 
McGimpsey 2015) and begun to assemble a ‘youth sector’ as a site of social investment.  
Working with assemblage theory (Venn 2006, Deleuze and Guatari 2004b, 
DeLanda 2006) and notions of neoliberalism applied within education policy sociology 
(Ball 2013), I begin by briefly setting out a conception of neoliberal public services as a 
complex, mobile apparatus that consists in the productive relations of diverse 
components. These ‘practical relations’, as Ball calls them (2013, loc. 1841), are the 
means by which the economic rationalism of neoliberalism is realized and extended in 
social body. The ‘late neoliberal regime’ is based on the established idea of neoliberal 
government as entailing the strategic conditioning of the development of public service 
apparatuses. To say ‘late neoliberal’ is specifically to make a distinction between phases 
of neoliberal reform, according to how distinctive ‘lines of force’ in each phase have 
inflected the emergence of public service apparatuses. I begin by briefly setting out 
these ideas. In the analysis that follows I show how such ‘late-neoliberal’ policy-
making, not limited simply to a fiscal policy of ‘austerity’, effected rapid reform of UK 
youth services. This analysis starts with a brief description of the expansion of youth 
services through quasi-marketisation during a prior phase of neoliberalism. I then 
describe how late neoliberalism has gone about its disassembling and assembling work 
focusing on: reforms to the distribution of capital to services; the place of social 
investment in policy discourse and the constitution of new notions of value and new 
objects of knowledge; and the reform of the field of youth provision, with increased 
hybridity in organizational forms in the new ‘youth sector’.  
Late neoliberalism and public service assemblage 
This analysis proceeds from a conception of youth services as an assemblage that 
emerged under the neoliberal regime, but that was subsequently ‘disassembled’ as a 
new ‘youth sector assemblage’ emerged. The language of ‘late neoliberal regime’ is 
used as a means of interpreting the distinctive reforming force that produced these latter 
effects.  
The notion of ’assemblage’ has been used in educational research for a variety 
of purposes (Youdell 2015). Here it conveys how fairly extensive ‘social apparatuses’ 
(Deleuze 1992) like the education assemblage, that are composed of complex and 
shifting arrangements of different parts (from elements of discourse, to bodies, money, 
buildings and so on), are produced and sustained in ‘machinic’ processes (Deleuze and 
Guatari 2004a). ‘Machinic’, as distinct from mechanistic, suggests production as a 
persistent, decentralized, distributed functioning based on the interconnections of these 
components; interconnections that produce machines that in turn ‘connect with other 
machines in a constant process of becoming’ (Tamboukou 2008, 366). Assemblage, 
thus, can be understood to imply the simultaneity of a social apparatus and the machinic 
functioning of that apparatus. ‘Assemblage’ has a dual sense of verb (assemblage as 
production) and noun (an assemblage as produced).  Assemblage implies both the 
existence of a ‘thing’ and a functioning through which the sense of ‘thing’ persists.  
From this perspective, to name an apparatus (for example, a local authority area’s youth 
service) or delineate a population of organisations (for example ‘youth organisations’) is 
to say less about the abiding qualities of something, and more about what a productive 
process has done in making and sustaining that thing as it is. Equally, a discontinuity 
such as the end of youth services describes the productive forces at play, albeit forces of 
a different quality and effect. ‘Assemblage’ refers to all of this this scene at once; it is a 
means of ‘thinking structure as well as multiplicity and indeterminacy’ (Venn 2006, 
107) simultaneously.   
Assemblage gives the notion of a ‘neoliberal regime’ a particular meaning, 
referring us specifically to the quality of the productive forces of neoliberal government. 
Ball, following Foucault, has described neoliberalism as a specific modality of 
government that relates truth, power and the subject through the constitution of a 
‘discursive field within which the exercise of power is “rationalised”’ (Ball 2013 loc. 
1688). Conceptualised in this way, ‘neoliberalism’ refers to constitution of a regulatory 
force through the investment of complex apparatuses of institutions, practices, norms, 
knowledges, and subjects, in a techno-ethical process of subjectivation conducive to 
capitalism. The neoliberal ‘regime’ connotes the sense in which the productivity of this 
‘tangle’ (Deleuze 1992, 159) of machines is subject to a certain regulation; the effect of 
giving complex, machinic assemblage a ‘trajectory’ (ibid.), sketching its lines in real-
time.  
To distinguish a phase of late neoliberalism or refer to a ‘late neoliberal regime’ 
is, then, not to claim a fundamental break with neoliberalism as a modality of 
government or its relation to capital. Late neoliberalism continues to involve the 
extension of market forms in domains of the public, civic, culture and subjectivity. Late 
neoliberalism is a distinction within the neoliberal regime of power, rather than a 
distinction from it, based on relatively general changes in how neoliberalism works to 
sustain itself. That distinctiveness can be understood in terms of the changing 
competence of certain ‘lines of force’ which effect the trajectory of complex public 
service apparatuses. And, as noted by Ball, this is the kind of change that has happened 
before in the UK since the late 1970s and is marked again by ‘austerity’ (Ball 2012b).  
Specifically, late neoliberalism refers to the growing effectiveness of finance 
capital imaginaries as distinct from productive capital imaginaries, in conditioning the 
trajectories of public service reform (McGimpsey 2017). Quasi-marketisation 
dominated recent decades of neoliberal reform of education (West and Pennell 2002, Le 
Grand 2001, Whitty 1997), based on a productive capital imaginary of the factory for 
the production of commodities, and the circulation of commodities through the market 
place of buyers and sellers. Late neoliberalism describes a situation in which a finance 
capital imaginary is increasingly effective in reform, whereby ‘investors’ trade in a 
futures market to realise a ‘return’. This is, of course, not to claim finance capital is 
‘new’ or that it has simply supplanted the quasi-market, but rather that it has grown 
more effective as a reforming force of youth sector provision, conditioning the 
emergence of the youth sector beyond the terms of ‘austerity’.  
In the analysis below I trace the line of neoliberal reform from the expansionary 
quasi-marketisation of UK youth services to the post-2008 reforms of capital 
distributions, policy discourse, technologies of knowledge production, and institutional 
morphology at a national scale of organisation. I show that beyond the constraints of 
‘austerity’, these latter reforms amount to the emergence of a new youth sector 
assemblage.   
Quasi-marketising reform 
‘We want to secure a modernised youth service…We have injected additional 
resources to make that happen. And with that fresh investment we expect to see 
reform’ Charles Clarke, Former Secretary of State for Education and Skills in 
Transforming Youth Work, 2002 
From the late 1990s, youth services in the UK underwent a period of neoliberal reform 
marked by the accelerated production of policy texts (DfEE 2001, DCSF 2007, DfES 
2005, 2006b, 2002). In common with education policy-making more generally, these 
reforms emphasised the use of competitive, quasi-market mechanisms to allocate 
resources (Whitty 1997, Whitty, Power, and Halpin 1998)  including: i) a repositioning 
of the state as purchaser rather than provider of services (Bovaird 2014), ii) the 
allocation of more capital through these market mechanisms, effecting a privatization of 
public service apparatus (Harris 2010), iii) ‘commodification’ of services such that they 
could be quantified and valued within the market (Lyotard 1984), and iv) the 
managerialist application of quality controls and audit as a means of control over 
decentralized ‘autonomous’ units of production (Ball 2003, Ball 2007).  
These amounted to expansionist reforms, with youth services scaled up through 
the allocation more funding to local authorities to spend on ‘securing access’ to services 
for young people aged 13-19. 
(Figure 1) 
Local authorities in receipt of these funds were required to ‘create a market’ based on 
‘competitive tendering processes’ (DfES 2006a, 16-17) where possible, rather than 
provide directly. The process of expanding provision was therefore privatizing in that it 
diverted public money to private organisations (typically not-for-profit), and 
commodifying in that it reconstituted grant funding (giving money to an organization 
for its stated aims with no direct exchange in mind) as the purchase of outputs. These 
moves were typical of reform of capital distributions to the voluntary sector during this 
period. Between 2000/1 and 2007/8, UK Government spending on the voluntary sector 
grew by more than £5billion (55%) as the sector was used to scale up public service 
provision. Yet money spent as grants fell during this period. Whereas contractual 
purchasing accounted for half of all money spent on the voluntary sector in 2001, by 
2008 it was almost three quarters of a larger pie (based on data from NCVO 2016).  
The commodification of youth provision such that it could be traded in the 
market, involved its rearticulation as an input:output system in which ‘value’ 
corresponds to the ratio of resources expended for units supplied. This entailed a new 
distinction between ‘universal’ and ‘targeted’ youth services, with the latter prioritized 
because its pre-determined interventions with delineated categories of young people 
were easy to record in the form of outputs. ‘Universal’ provision by contrast 
encompasses open-ended relationships, dialogue and the creation of informal leisure 
spaces such as youth centres or clubs, wherein no such output can easily be determined 
in advance or even necessarily exists (Jeffs 2008, Smith 1988, Smith and Doyle 2002). 
Universal services remained a significant part of youth service delivery, such that 
government sought to reconstitute them as structured ‘positive activities’ (DfES 2005) 
that could be more easily defined and purchased. These moves recast Local Authorities 
as ‘commissioners’ of the ‘local menu’ of ‘positive activities’ (DfES 2005), with young 
people choosing to participate becoming ‘consumers’ of youth services.  
Such privatizing and commodifying reforms were the grounds for the 
application of output targets for youth services (see New Labour's Transforming Youth 
Work agenda: DfEE 2001, DfES 2002). ‘Public Service Agreements’ (PSAs), 
introduced by the first New Labour government, were the most significant mechanism 
for the implementation of targets. PSAs were agreements between HM Treasury and 
‘delivery partners’ including local authorities (HM Government 2008), that  established 
measureable outputs across a range of public service areas including youth services, and 
a related set of targets for delivery. Targets formed the basis for performance 
management, where they functioned as i) indicators of progress towards policy 
outcomes, and ii) as the basis of contract ‘deliverables’, holding Local Authorities and 
their suppliers to account. By including youth services in this centrally mandated 
targeting regime, the neoliberal regime found a means of specifying and regulating 
youth provision within decentralized systems of ‘autonomous’ providers, in similar 
fashion to other forms of education provision (Youdell 2006, 8).  
As in other areas of education, quasi-marketisation of youth services not only 
changed the mechanism by which resources were allocated but changed the ‘product’ 
itself. As a result, neoliberal youth service policy has been subject to consistent critique 
for its effects on provision, in spite of the rising levels of spending that accompanied it. 
As small and medium sized voluntary sector providers of youth services increasingly 
contracted with the state, open-access provision gave way to fixed-term projects, based 
on pre-planned and structured activity, narrowly targeted at “excluded” or “hard to 
reach” individuals (Davies and Merton 2009, Wylie 2008, Spence, Devanney, and 
Noonan 2006). The establishment of output-based contract forms further led to the 
introduction of new measurement, evaluation and performance management practices 
(Bunyan and Ord 2012, Jeffs 2008, Cooper 2012, Davies 2012), resulting in more 
formalised and bureaucratic relations with young people as workers were forced to 
assess eligibility for programmes and measure, record and report fulfilment of outputs, 
and to judge project performance against targets.  
The late neoliberal regime 
Capital distributions 
The language of austerity and cuts has been central to critical responses to youth policy 
since 2008, and not without reason. After the financial crisis there was an immediate 
reversal of the rising trend in spending by Local Authorities in England, and by 2009/10 
there had been a 12% fall (House of Commons Education Committee 2011, 28-29). 
Between 2010/11 and 2014/15 Local Authority annual spending on youth services from 
central government revenue funding fell a further 30% (NCB 2015, 12), driving a rapid 
disassembly of the neoliberal youth service assemblage. Surveys by the trade union 
Unison indicate that between 2012 and 2014, youth services in England saw the loss of 
thousands of jobs, tens of thousands of young people’s places, and the closure of 
hundreds of youth centersii (Unison 2014).  
However, the decapitalization of existing local youth services does not only 
involve lower levels of overall spending. A significant proportion of ‘cuts’ are better 
understood as the redirection of capital enacted via a withdrawal of the controls on 
monetary flows that were established during quasi-marketisation. First, the 
performance-management regime of national public service targets was dismantled 
when target-based PSAs were scrapped across government in 2010, and replaced with 
departmental Business Plans based on ‘Impact Indicators’ (Institute for Government 
2013). Then in 2011, the financial controls that ensured central government funds were 
used in local markets of youth service provision (referred to as ‘ring-fencing’) were 
removed. In place of funds dedicated to youth services, revenue streams for youth 
services, children’s services and family services were rolled together in the ‘Early 
Intervention Grant’ (EIG).  
Within the EIG, and following the withdrawal of national output targets and 
ring-fenced funding, local quasi-markets of youth services not only suffered but 
suffered disproportionately. The National Children’s Bureau and the Children’s Society 
point out that, keeping budgetary definitions as consistent as possible, funding within 
the EIG was reduced by 24% between 2010-11 and 2014-15. However, levels of 
spending on youth services fell by around 30%, while family services fell by as little as 
4% (NCB 2015). Within youth services, universal provision lost out disproportionately 
to targeted services (DfE 2014b)iii.  
As well as the withdrawal of controls on local authority spending, the redirection 
of capital is effected by new regulations that affect commissioning. As noted above, 
quasi-marketisation of youth services involved scaling up provision primarily through 
the purchase of outputs from local not-for-profit private providers. In 2012, the UK 
Coalition Government passed the Public Services (Social Value) Act (HM Government 
2012), requiring commissioners to assess services’ impact on outcomes related to 
‘economic, social or environmental well-being’, as distinct from outputs. This legal 
assertion of new evaluative norms of outcome-based investment coincides with newly 
introduced ‘rights’ for any potential public service provider to demand a commissioning 
process be undertaken with respect to services currently provided by the state. Framed 
using the language of ‘community’ and ‘civil society’ and ‘localism’, this ‘Community 
right to challenge’ (DCLG 2011) empowers any private party to demand the 
privatization of public service supply. These rights extend to public sector staff, who 
gained the right to reconstitute themselves as an employee-owned ‘mutual’ company, 
potentially for-profit, and ‘bid to take over the services they deliver’ (HM Government 
2011a, 42). Together, these changes mean that local authority spending on youth 
services is redistributed according to different aims, to different areas of service, and 
across a broader range of organisations.  
Moreover, there has been the creation of significant new funding streams that 
bypass local authorities and local quasi-markets, captializing youth provision in 
different ways. The most prominent example is the UK Government’s investment in the 
National Citizen Service (NCS), which was piloted in 2011. The annual budget for the 
NCS in 2013 was reported to be £62M (Booth et al. 2014, 39), £88.7M in 2014 (Booth 
et al. 2015, 51-52), and the UK Government has pledged to spend a further £1billion on 
the programme between 2017 and 2020 (Offord 2016a). The 2014 NCS budget 
amounted to around a third of the total annual cut in local authority spending on youth 
services through the EIG. The 2018 budget for the NCS will be roughly triple the 2014 
level. The programme is managed by the NCS Trust (Booth et al. 2015, 13), a ‘not-for-
profit social enterprise’ who distribute this capital to their ‘delivery partners’ including 
organisations in the voluntary sector, social enterprise, statutory and private sector 
providers (NCS Trust 2017). The largest of these providers is the Challenge Network, a 
national organisation founded in 2009 and developed specifically to provide the NCS 
services. Of its £52.44M income in 2014/15, £47.15M was spent on the provision of 
National Citizen Service, up from a £32.66M expenditure on NCS the previous year.  
The Challenge Network made a surplus in 2014/15 of over £3M.  
During the same five-year period from 2010, the UK government also 
capitalized social investment markets through the formation of Big Society Capital 
which was given £400M of public money, securing a further £200M from private 
sources. This markets are distinct as money is distributed via a raft of investment 
‘intermediaries’ for the purposes of ‘social investment’ in outcomes (HM Government 
2011b, Cabinet Office 2012b). This social investment capital was not specifically 
earmarked for youth services, but these markets are growing quickly (Jones 2013) and 
the UK Government made clear its intention that intermediaries would consider youth 
provision when investing (House of Commons Education Committee 2011, 31). These 
funds are strategically important in the reassembly of a distinct apparatus of youth 
provision that competes for social investment. As The Young Foundation put it, in the 
two years 2010-2012 in which Local Authority spending on youth services fell by 
£307.5M, ‘the social finance market has grown rapidly to over £600 million offering 
funding to generate both a social and financial return’ (Jones 2013, 4).    
The speed of these reforms has been extraordinary. Within three years of the 
financial crash local authorities were no longer required to sustain a local market of 
youth services, and newly established funds were not simply smaller but acted to 
redistribute capital. It took just five years to effectively disassemble the neoliberal youth 
service apparatus. Yet significant capital is flowing into youth provision after the 
financial crisis, though not through established local markets of youth services. Where 
local authorities are still commissioning local youth services, they are now legislatively 
bound to consider notions of impact and social outcome, distinct from outputs. New 
organisations – from the NCS Trust to the range of social investment intermediary 
bodies – have been created to perform a distributive task previously undertaken by local 
authorities. Once the dominance of the quasi-market as a means of capital allocation 
was undermined, where money went and what it could be exchanged for quickly 
changed.  Money that had been reconstituted by neoliberalism from charitable funding 
to contract purchase was reconstituted again as investment capital. This has acted as a 
potent force of disassembly and reassembly, reconstituting the quasi-marketised local 
scale as a field of ‘social investment’ in ‘outcomes’. 
The finance capital imaginary 
Since the financial crash there has been a rapid, transnational rise of ‘social investment’ 
in policy discourse (Rees 2014), that has been particularly pronounced in the UK 
(Bovaird 2014, 1-2). Indeed, former Prime Minister David Cameron understood the UK 
to be at the forefront of social investment as a policy export:  
We’ve got a great idea here that can transform our societies, by using the power of 
finance to tackle the most difficult social problems…drug abuse, youth 
unemployment, homelessness and even global poverty. The potential for social 
investment is that big. So I want to make it a success in Britain and I want to sell it 
all over the world. 
In 2013, London became home to the world’s first ‘Social Stock Exchange’ (Social 
Stock Exchange 2015), while social investment has been integrated into legal 
frameworks (HM Government 2012).  
The rise of social investment is bound up with a change in the policy imaginary 
(Ball 2012a). The neoliberal imaginary has involved a play of signifiers of markets as 
spaces of buying and selling, of suppliers, prices, of best value, of informed and rational 
purchasers, choosers and consumers. All these reflect an imaginary of productive 
capital; of the public service qua factory located in the market place and subjected to 
competitive pressures. The prominence of social investment in the post-crisis late 
neoliberal regime is suggestive of a finance capital imaginary; an imaginary not of 
production and consumption but of investment and return, with public services a kind of 
futures market.  
In this finance capital imaginary, different signifiers articulate in the constitution 
of ‘value’. ‘Social investment’ connects with ‘return on investment’, emphasising the 
importance of public services as producers of ‘outcomes’. An outcome is typically a 
variable measured at a population level that can be articulated as the desirable result that 
should follow from the supply of the output (LSE Enterprise 2014, 8-9). Whereas 
outputs (typically a plural noun) are the direct result of the productive activity of the 
supplier, outcomes are longer term and/or of wider scale and not the result of any single 
productive activity (Harlock 2014, 5). Outcomes are thus subject to a form of statistical 
causality; it would not generally be said that an output causes an outcome, but that a 
measurable change in a variable that serves as a proxy for an outcome might be 
predicted to follow the production of outputs. Such a measurable change is referred to 
as ‘impact’. 
Impact functions as an expression of value in a social investment market through 
the connection of outputs to outcomes. Such connections are made through increasingly 
common policy ‘translations’ of scientific or social scientific knowledges (McGimpsey, 
Bradbury and Santori 2016). For example, from neuroscience and psychology comes 
the suggestion that certain parenting practices in infancy lead to a reduced likelihood of 
teenage pregnancy or unemployment in later life (Allen 2011). The economic value of 
an impact can then be quantified through an actuarial approach based on projected costs 
to the state of associated public services or welfare benefits. The economic value of a 
reduction in future demand for services and benefits, derived from a correlation of 
outputs to outcomes, can be compared to the costs of producing that impact. Such a 
calculation can then be used to justify social investment in a service on the basis of a 
projected ‘cashable return’ to the state. The naming of the ‘Early Intervention Grant’ 
was no accident. 
In UK Government youth service policy, this shift of imaginary is felt as the 
original neoliberal deal of quasi-marketising reform for sustained capital flows breaks 
down, with policy texts blaming providers for their ‘limited ability to measure and 
demonstrate their impact’ (HM Government 2011b, 83). Compliance with the neoliberal 
regime of competition on price, audit and output reporting is no longer effective, and 
youth services that had been constituted through expanding quasi-markets struggle to 
rearticulate themselves in the terms of finance capital as a ‘social investment’. 
Responses to this changing policy imaginary can be seen in the establishment of 
new industry bodies, with the support of policy-makers, dedicated to the articulation of 
the value of youth provision in terms of impact, and to promoting an ‘investment ready’ 
(Pinch and Sunley 2012, 120) youth sector. In Positive for Youth the UK Government 
articulates the aim to ‘…develop…an ‘industry standard’ common language for the 
outcomes that services for young people are aiming to deliver...’ (HM Government 
2011b, 83-84). This aim was enacted through sector-wide efforts towards the production 
of evidence of ‘impact’. This has included government support for the measurement of 
overall national impact of youth provision through the Centre for the Analysis of Youth 
Transitions (CAYT) based at the influential Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) (HM 
Government 2011b, 83). Government also funded a consortium of think tanks and 
national youth provider bodies ‘to work with voluntary youth organisations to increase 
their understanding and readiness for social investment and broker their access to 
investment opportunities’ (HM Government 2011b, 80). Since 2014 the government has 
provided funding for a successor organization, the Centre for Youth Impact, which 
works with commissioners and providers of youth services to produce evidence 
showing ‘how investment in youth services is of benefit to everyone’ (The Centre for 
Youth Impact 2014).  
At the level of providers and funders, there has been a growth in the production 
and use of toolkits for measuring return on investment. Youth service providers have 
increasingly used these evaluation practices to represent their work in terms of return on 
investment in order to compete for funds (Arvidson and Kara 2013), with such 
representations of typically ‘strongly influenced by economic conceptions of value’ 
(Harlock 2013, 7). For example:   
We found that for every £1 invested in the project, £7 of value is created for the 
state and the local community. A large proportion of this comes from savings to the 
victims of youth and gang violence that used to be common in the area. (Nevill and 
Poortvliet 2011, 6) 
As the pilot programme costs nearly £14.2m to government, the societal benefits 
are between one and two times the cost, showing a net benefit to UK society. 
(Natcen Social Research, The Office for Public Management, and New 
Philanthropy Capital 2012, 13) 
The last quote is from the evaluation of the NCS pilot programme. As noted above, the 
NCS is a significant example of money being spent on creating new youth provision at a 
time of ostensible ‘austerity’. It is also significant as an example of youth provision 
understood consistently and explicitly in social investment terms. Following political 
controversy over the UK government’s decision to expand investment in the service, the 
Chief Executive of the National Citizen Service Trust, Stephen Green, publicly 
defended the value of the service by saying:  
Cost is only one half of an equation, so return on investment and the value that 
investment yields is absolutely critical. And so what are the outcomes our young 
people are experiencing very much has to be looked at… Educational attainment so 
seven out of ten have gone on to do more. We’re working with [the UK 
Universities and Colleges Admissions Services] to track how much more they get 
engaged in higher education. Eight out of ten talk about the contacts that they made 
in the programme three years on, people from different backgrounds.  So this is the 
way we stitch our young people together and help them lead local 
communities…We find that one pound yields back over £4.15 in terms of 
wellbeing.’ (Stephen Green quoted in BBC News 2017) 
The articulation of youth provision and its value in these terms connects 
organisations to the increasing amounts of capital distributed through ‘impact investing’ 
(Puttick and Ludlow 2012), whether directly by central government or by social 
investment intermediaries. These changes to capital distribution and policy discourse 
production should be understood as yet another phase of ‘steering’ education provision 
through the structuring of a market (Ball and Gerwitz 1997, 207-208), this time through 
the distinctive terms of finance capital.  
Reforming the field of supply 
In 1938, the UK government took its first significant step towards establishing a 
national Youth Service by expanding the state’s role in provision. The neoliberal regime 
reimagined provision as a competitive field of local ‘youth services’, with supply 
capacity predominantly provided by small- or medium-sized voluntary organisations. In 
each case, policy makers took a different view on the ‘acceptable balance between 
voluntary and statutory’ suppliers in youth provision (Davies 1999, 21) 
Following the disassembly of youth services, the phrase ‘youth sector’ has 
emerged to describe a more loosely organised field of providers (see for example Rocyn 
Jones 2013, Institute for Youth Work 2013, DfE 2014a, National Council for Voluntary 
Youth Services 2015), in which the significance of voluntary, public or private status is 
diminished. Part of a broader ‘localism’ in public policy (McGimpsey 2017), the youth 
sector maintains a rhetorical appeal to ‘small, non-professionalised, volunteer-only 
groups and activities’ (MacMillan 2012, 7) even as the demands of ‘investment 
readiness’ favour larger charities, consortia, private companies and new social 
enterprises (NCVO 2016).  
The changing organisational composition of the youth sector is related to a 
number of other changes at the level of provision. Youth sector providers are entering 
into different funding relationships. Local government commissioners, as investors in 
social outcomes, are increasingly using ‘payment-by-results’ contracting mechanisms in 
which pre-defined indicators of impact control the timing of payments to the provider 
(CLG 2012). In effect, rather than paying up front for the purchase of outputs to be 
delivered, the commissioner is retrospectively giving the provider an agreed fraction of 
the value of the return that has been realised by the service. This reduced emphasis on 
outputs and shifting of risk away from government (HM Government, 2011a, p. 29) has 
involved significant practical changes for providers. First, it has reduced the interest of 
commissioners in the process of delivery, encouraging what has been referred to as ‘black 
box commissioning’ (NYA and LGA 2012, 14), and, arguably, giving providers greater 
freedom ‘to propose new ways to deliver services’ (HM Government 2011a, 29). Second, 
by emphasising retrospective payment, it has increased youth service providers’ demand 
for investment to provide sufficient operating capital. This demand for capital is fulfilled 
through arrangements that include provision of repayable loans both by mainstream 
commercial creditors, retained surplus schemes, owner investments, formal partnerships 
or mergers with larger entities, as well as specialist social investment vehicles (Lyon 
and Baldock 2014). These capital demands increase the costs and consequences of 
failure for providers, simultaneously promoting the financialisation of the new youth 
sector and binding providers even more closely to pre-specified performance goals.  
Outside commissioning, there is growing emphasis on forms of social 
investment funding.  While different social investment vehicles place more or less 
emphasis on direct commercial or social returns, all have the concept of return on 
investment in common. The logic is well expressed by social impact bonds whereby:  
‘investors pay for a set of interventions to improve a social outcome that is of 
social and/or financial interest to a government commissioner. If the social 
outcome improves, the government commissioner repays the investors for the 
initial investment plus a return for the financial risks they took.’ (Social Finance 
2016)  
While demand among suppliers for repayable social investment capital from 
specialist providers has been relatively low (Lyon and Baldock 2014), social investment 
markets have significantly expanded in recent years and high profile trials of Social 
Impact Bonds for youth provision are being conducted in cites in England supported by 
the National Youth Agency (Powell 2016). Although distinct from payment by results 
mechanisms, such investment vehicles also serve to constitute risk in terms of the 
failure to realise a return on investment, and then distribute that risk away from the state 
to provider and private investors.  
These funding relationships drive important effects on the organizational 
morphology of supply within the emergent youth sector. The sector is notably marked 
by greater organisational hybridity, as the supply of capital as investment promotes 
‘social enterprise’ organisations that can combine earned income from service provision 
with investment income as well as more traditional forms of contracting and funding, 
and whose directors can be paid. The NCS Trust is a prominent example. There are also 
a growing number ‘mutuals’ in youth services (Offord 2016b), created by ‘spinning out’ 
(Cabinet Office 2012a) all or part of public sector youth services into employee-owned 
organisations, that may be constituted as ‘profit-making businesses, which operate for 
primarily commercial objectives’ (Cabinet Office 2010, 5). As well as effects on the 
form of individual organisations, changes to funding have also driven relationships 
between them. These include formal mergers and consortia that allow the pooling of 
capital and sharing of financial risk, as well as looser forms of collaboration based on 
notions of ‘collective impact’ (Centre for Youth Impact 2016a, Collaboration for Impact 
2016) that mirror developments elsewhere in education (Olmedo 2013, Olmedo, Bailey, 
and Ball 2013).  
The growing financial value of social outcomes has further led to changing 
evaluative techniques and a growing ‘datafication’ (Roberts-Holmes and Bradbury 
2016) associated with evidencing return on investment. In contrast to the effects of 
quasi-marketisation on practice, this involves a reduced emphasis on targeting pre-
categorised groups of young people and on measures of: 
‘the tangible and concrete aspects of [youth provision]: indicators such as number 
of accredited qualifications achieved, numbers of hours of services provided, or 
attendance for example…[These] recognised outputs...are often poor at capturing 
the true value of services’ (McNeil, Reeder, and Rich 2012, 9). 
Instead, facilitated by the proliferation of toolkits for impact assessment noted above, 
young people’s bodies and behaviours are reconstituted as sites for data production in 
youth projects that function as centres of calculation of impact, expressed in statistical 
terms and as a financial return on investment. These toolkits are often based on theories 
of change that deploy measures of young people’s attitudes, emotions, psychological 
capacities, social networks, and overall well-being as signifiers of valuable impact on 
‘positive life outcomes, including educational attainment, employment and health’ 
(McNeil, Reeder, and Rich 2012, 4). Youth provision is driven towards tightly 
organised, fixed-term interventions, based on these externally imposed aims and targets. 
This time in continuity with prior neoliberal reforms, this organisation of youth 
provision in short-term interventions mitigates against open-ended provision, and has 
been linked to a casualisation of the workforce (de St Croix 2016). 
The NCS again provides a notable illustration of these trends, consisting of a 
fixed-term, structured intervention lasting just a few weeks, that engages young people 
in preparation for, planning and carrying out ‘social action’ in a community setting. 
Youth social action is a notable example of a long tradition of youth provision that is 
rearticulated in terms of social investment and impact, as it ‘boosts’ young people’s 
‘empathy…cooperation…[leading to improved] employability by making them stronger 
candidates in interviews’ (Centre for Youth Impact 2016b, see also Kirkman et al. 
2016). While the NCS is voluntary with its notion of service bound up with local ‘civil 
society’, it cites the tradition of military service in a rhetorical appeal to universal duty 
to nation and fellow citizen, combined with individualistic concerns with personal well-
being and skills development (Mycock and Tonge 2011). The aims of the NCS 
programme revolve around the production of the citizen who is more capable and 
inclined to take individual and collective action (Bacon, Frankel, and Faulks 2013); this 
is the compliant citizen of ‘practices’ and ‘habits’ (Mills and Waite 2017, 70) the 
production of whom constitutes value within the late neoliberal regime. The NCS 
evaluation methodology measures ‘impact’ in terms of ‘distance travelled’ and by 
comparison to population-wide indicators on leadership, social action or volunteering, 
and ‘aspirations and sense of control over their future…resilience…and wellbeing’ 
(Cameron et al. 2017, 27).  These impacts are expressed in monetary terms as a 
financial yield in relation to cost, with respect to the direct value of social action during 
the weeks of the NCS programme and longer term outcomes based on an underlying 
theory of change. For example, impacts on ‘leadership’ skills are statistically expressed. 
Then, based on ‘[a] US study has demonstrated that leadership skills…can have long-
term effects on the earnings of individuals’, the value of the impacts on leadership skills 
is calculated at between £84.8M and £153.5M in the lifetime earnings of participants. 
Similar calculations of the financial value of long-term health benefits and increases in 
volunteering are also performed.  
Conclusion 
A new youth sector assemblage is emerging under the late neoliberal regime, central to 
which is a finance capital imaginary. The language of austerity that has framed many 
accounts of public policy since the financial crisis, including education policy, gives 
little scope to account for the productivity of neoliberal policy since the financial crisis. 
I show how in this phase, late neoliberal policy making has constituted forces of reform, 
of disassembly and reassembly, of UK youth services through the reconstitution and 
redistribution of capital, policy texts and imaginaries, and organizational forms and 
practices.  
Where neoliberalism had used the (quasi-)market for the efficient allocation of 
capital to services providing outputs, late neoliberalism establishes a futures market 
trading in outcomes. Where neoliberalism saw every £X purchasing a quantity of youth 
services places, late neoliberalism claims that every £X invested nets a return of £Y in 
the long run. The neoliberal regime had reduced the service of young people, like so 
much educational provision, to the production of a commodity to be consumed. Late 
neoliberalism reimagines commodity production as the creation of opportunities to 
invest. Where the quasi-market constituted the local offer with the young person as 
individual consumer, local authority as purchaser, and youth service as provider, late 
neoliberalism constitutes the outcome variable, its correlative impact variables, and an 
actuarial calculation of the value of impact in monetary terms.  
In these austere times government no longer purchases, but invests; either 
directly or by stimulating private investment in services by promising a return as a 
fraction of the financial value of the impact on outcomes. Successful service delivery is 
increasingly that which can attract investment by constituting a credible relationship 
between service provision, impact on outcomes, and cost to the state in terms of 
services or welfare. These are the conditions of the emergence of a late neoliberal youth 
sector assemblage.  
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Figure 1. Chart showing the levels of statutory funding distributed to local authorities 
for youth services between 2003/4 and 2007/8.  
                                                 
i I refer specifically to England as, while austerity policy can reasonably be understood to apply 
to the UK as a whole, policy and regulation regarding youth services is, to a significant 
degree, devolved to the parliaments of individual nations.  
                                                                                                                                               
ii These numbers are deliberately left unspecified as the methodology used, while providing a 
useful sense of the scale and rapidity of change, cannot provide specific numbers. First, the 
survey is based on survey responses by local authorities. A large number of authorities 
responded, but not all. As I explained late, given large and growing geographic variations in 
spending on youth services, it is not entirely safe to generalise from this sample to a wider 
population. Further, it is not clear if what is being referred to as youth service spending is 
consistent with definitions used in prior years.  
iii This preference for targeted over even a consumer-oriented open-access ‘local offer’ is a 
pattern replicated in the cuts to children’s services (NCB 2015), suggesting a wider pattern 
of reform in late-neoliberal regulation. 
